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Edward Kanterian’s Ludwig Wittgenstein is a solid, accurate, well-written intel­
lectual biography whose purpose in life is unclear. In keeping with the guiding 
principle of the Critical Lives series of which it is part, the book seeks to place 
Wittgenstein and his work in the cultural context of the modern period (i.e., 
the late nineteenth and early-to-mid twentieth centuries). The book also offers 
a critical perspective on Wittgenstein’s work and the existing secondary litera­
ture. These three ambitions—biography, modernity, and criticism—coexist 
uneasily, making it unclear who the book’s audience is intended to be. 
Although it is accurate and inclusive as a biography, it is not a rival to Ray 
Monk’s Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Penguin, 1991), to which 
Kanterian pays his respects. The discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is 
REVIEWS 299
 
again accurate and thoughtful, but not enough information is presented for a 
reader otherwise unfamiliar with the original work to form more than a 
general idea about it. The critical discussion of the secondary literature is 
selective and surprisingly tendentious. In criticizing W.W. Bartley and Colin 
Wilson regarding Wittgenstein’s sexuality (194–95), Terry Eagleton regarding 
Wittgenstein’s inﬂuences (74; 160), and the idea that Wittgenstein’s work may 
have been inﬂuenced by an alleged dyslexia (102), among other claims, 
Kanterian is engaging in interpretive and critical battles that are of interest 
to specialists, who do not need the brief biography and summary of the phil­
osophy, but probably not to the nonexpert reader who wants an introduction 
to the man and his work. Finally, Kanterian’s complaint that the “Wittgenstein 
industry” risks obscuring the thought rather than elucidating it by publishing 
so many “competing interpretations, philological debates, new ‘readings’, 
introductions, textbooks for students, collections of papers, conference 
proceedings, dissertations, [and so forth]” (200) strikes an oddly self-doubting 
note, virtually daring the reader to question the value of the book itself (and 
perhaps thus slyly recalling section 6.54 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
in which Wittgenstein claimed that a reader who had understood the book 
would thereby realize that it was all nonsense). 
As far as biography goes, the book contains even-handed treatments of the 
major periods in Wittgenstein’s life, from the childhood in Vienna to the root­
less yet remarkably productive ﬁnal few years before Wittgenstein’s death. 
Kanterian deals frankly and clearly with Wittgenstein’s several romantic 
and sexual relationships with men, though he rejects the interpretation that 
Wittgenstein is best understood as homosexual (107). Similarly, the question 
of Wittgenstein’s religious views, and their signiﬁcance to his philosophy, gets 
careful and extensive treatment, and Kanterian forcefully argues against the 
interpretation that religion and ethics were central to the inspiration for the 
Tractatus (50; 65–67; 84–86). His claim that “The philosophy of the Tractatus 
can be seen as defending science against metaphysics” (84) puts him ﬁrmly 
on one side of a debate, the other side of which argues that the point of the 
Tractatus is to defend ethics and religion from the self-conﬁdent nonsense of 
scientism (see, for example, Robert Fogelin’s Wittgenstein [Second edition, 
Routledge, 1987] at 99). 
The other two aims of the book—to put Wittgenstein into the context of 
modernity and to offer a critical view of the existing literature—blend 
together. Kanterian makes clear early on that his intention is revisionist: 
“There is . . .  an imbalance between Wittgenstein’s present-day public 
persona and the character of his actual work, which this book attempts to 
correct” (8). I have already mentioned several of the critical debates 
that Kanterian engages. He also responds critically to the claim that 
Wittgenstein’s miserable experience as a primary-school teacher was central 
to his later philosophy (101), and to the “romantic cult” that he perceives 
regarding Wittgenstein’s several sojourns in Norway, which were typically 
productive philosophically, but also apparently lonely and emotionally 
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painful personally (141). More generally, Kanterian is dryly derisive of what 
he appears to see as faddish interpretations of Wittgenstein’s work. For 
example, he writes: “More recently, Wittgenstein has been also portrayed as 
a postmodernist, a relativist, a poet (or even as a Pyrrhonist, Zen-Buddhist 
or rabbinical thinker). These are strange interpretations of a man who 
towards the end of his life said that his chief contribution had been in the 
philosophy of mathematics” (203). 
How, then, should we understand Wittgenstein? Kanterian gives us a hint 
when he says, “Wittgenstein lived in the modern age, the age of intellectuals, 
of charismatic writers, thinkers and artists whose lives capture the collective 
imagination, since they incorporate some of the deepest tensions of moder­
nity, and maybe even suggest some solutions to them” (8). Many of 
Kanterian’s interpretive positions seem to represent a desire to understand 
Wittgenstein as a representative modern and to reject interpretations that 
are inspired by more recent intellectual trends. Thus, for example, 
Kanterian rejects the claim that Wittgenstein’s work was in some way 
inﬂuenced by his putative homosexuality (see the story of Barry Pink on 
pp. 194–95), but endorses Monk’s quasi-Freudian assessment that 
Wittgenstein was tormented by the conﬂict between romantic love and sexu­
ality of any kind (134). Similarly, in rejecting the claim that religion and ethics 
were primary in the genesis of the Tractatus, Kanterian argues that 
Wittgenstein’s experience in the First World War was transformative, 
echoing a major theme of twentieth-century literature: “Questions about life 
and death were of personal not philosophical concern to Wittgenstein at this 
time. . . .  To claim some kind of unity between his logical investigations 
and his religious problems is to romanticize the former and trivialize the 
latter” (66). As another example, the emphasis that Kanterian puts on 
Wittgenstein’s embodiment of and preference for high culture, and 
Wittgenstein’s belief that Western culture had become decadent (11–12, 
137), puts the focus on conﬂicts that were alive to intellectuals of 
Wittgenstein’s day, but that have since lost salience. 
From the perspective of this reading, one disappointment is that Kanterian 
does not develop the idea that Wittgenstein’s life might “suggest some 
solutions” to the “deepest tensions of modernity” (8). The problems that 
Wittgenstein struggled with, both personally and intellectually, are mostly 
still our problems. Both his life and his work do indeed suggest some 
methods of coping with them—“solutions” is too strong—but 
Wittgenstein’s was an austere regimen. On a personal level, he appears to 
have sought self-understanding and clarity about his own character, 
without much hope of improving it. Philosophically, Wittgenstein hoped to 
help us get out of perplexities that we could not help but fall into, a misfor­
tune that we call philosophy. He did not aspire to solve those problems, or 
to help us avoid falling into them in the ﬁrst place, but rather to help us alle­
viate the anxiety and confusion that they cause. From this perspective, we 
probably cannot learn to be different, but we can learn to suffer less. 
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That is a message ﬁrmly rooted in modernity—think, for example, of Freud’s 
explanation of the purpose of psychotherapy—and one that Wittgenstein 
struggled to make clear to himself and to us. 
–Matthew J. Moore 
